Abstract. We study a problem that generalizes the fair allocation of indivisible goods. The input is a matroid and a set of agents. Each agent has his own utility for every element of the matroid. Our goal is to build a base of the matroid and provide worst case guarantees on the additive utilities of the agents. These utilities are private, an assumption that is commonly made for the fair division of divisible resources, Since the use of an algorithm is not appropriate in this context, we resort to protocols, like in cake cutting problems. Our contribution is a protocol where the agents can interact and build a base of the matroid. If there are up to 8 agents, we show how everyone can ensure that his worst case utility for the resulting base is the same as those given by Markakis and Psomas [18] for the fair allocation of indivisible goods, based on the guarantees of Demko and Hill [8] .
Introduction
We study a problem defined on a matroid M and a set N of n agents. The agents have non-negative and additive utilities for the subsets of elements of M. The aim is to find a single base B of M and provide some guarantees on the agents' utility for B. Our problem is a generalization of the allocation of indivisible goods. Dealing with matroids -a classical structure in combinatorial optimization -allows to cover applications whose feasibility constraints are more complex. Let us give a concrete example.
Example 1.
A department of computer science is composed of n teams which attend a common seminar. The seminar consists of m fixed dates and one has to select m speakers out of a pool of candidates. The candidates have preliminarily given their availabilities for the m dates. Each team has its own interest for the candidates but the order by which the talks are given does not matter. A solution is a subset of speakers, under the constraint that a feasible assignment (one available speaker per date) exists. The head of the department, who is in charge of the program of the seminar, needs to find a feasible solution. To be fair, he also has to take the interest of all teams into account.
Matroids are defined in Section 3 and the matroid structure of Example 1 is clarified in Section 4. Beforehand, let us situate our work. The allocation of scarce resources (e.g. water, bandwidth, grants) is a recurrent problem. A challenge is to propose methods which lead to fair and efficient solutions. The distinction between divisible and indivisible goods is typically made. Another important information is about agents' utilities: are they publicly known or private?
Though a large body of literature is devoted to the case of divisible goods [23, 6, 7, 19, 25, 20] , the computer science community is paying more attention to the allocation of indivisible resources [16, 3, 9, 2, 14, 1, 18, 5, 13] , especially when there is no monetary compensation. In case of public utilities, an algorithm can determine the allocation. In case of private utilities, the agents may take part of the determination of the final solution via a protocol. Our work is related to the indivisible goods. Let us review its connections with previous results.
In [8] , Demko and Hill consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods with additive utilities. They show the existence of an allocation with an explicit guarantee on the utility of the poorest agent. This guarantee is V n (α) where n is the number of agents and α is defined as the largest utility for a single good, over the whole set of agents in a normalized instance. V n is a nonincreasing function of α. Markakis and Psomas revisit the work of Demko and Hill with a constructive approach [18] . They propose a polynomial time algorithm called Allocate. It outputs an allocation such that agent i's utility is at least V n (α i ) where α i is agent i's maximum utility for a single good. Since V n is nonincreasing and
The allocation of indivisible goods can be extended to the determination of a single base of a matroid. This is done in [10] where a new guarantee W n (α i ) is provided for every agent i such that α i is agent i's maximum utility for an element of the matroid in a normalized instance. W n is a non-monotonic function satisfying W n (x) ≥ V n (x) for all x and n. This guarantee is obtained via a polynomial time algorithm called Threshold which is an extension of Allocate.
Both Allocate and Threshold work with publicly known utilities. In this article, we study private utilities in the generalized context of matroids. So, we borrow ideas from cake cutting problems. We propose a deterministic protocol for finding a base of a matroid such that every agent's utility is at least V n (α i ). In this context, α i is agent i's largest utility for a single element of the matroid. Up to our knowledge, there is no previous work on protocols for matroids. Moreover, protocols for indivisible goods under private utilities are not numerous (see chapter 2 of [7] for Knaster's procedure of sealed bids and Lucas' method of markers). The result that is closest to our work is a randomized protocol for two agents inspired by the famous Divide-and-Choose procedure [3] .
The paper is organized as follows. Related works are presented in Section 2. A formal presentation of our model is given in Section 3. Section 4 contains some general properties on matroids. Our first contribution consists of two protocols for 2 and 3 agents presented in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. They introduce a general protocol given in Section 7 which works for up to 8 agents. We conclude this article with a discussion. Due to space limitations, some proofs are omitted.
Related Work
The problem of fairly allocating a given set of goods to a given set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents has received a lot of attention in economic theory (social science in particular) and, more recently, in theoretical computer science. The problem admits numerous variants and one can list some of them by answering to the following questions. Are the goods divisible or indivisible? Are the agents' utilities (for portions or subsets of the goods) public or private? Which notion of fairness is cast? The last question is itself a vast topic of research [7, 19, 25] .
The representation and the manipulation of agents' utility functions for every possible portion of the goods can be a barrier. To avoid this, the community has mainly concentrated on additive utilities.
Let us introduce some notations for the rest of this section: S denotes the entire set of goods, S i refers to the share of an agent i ∈ N , (S i ) i∈N is an allocation (profile of disjoint shares) and u i (S i ) is agent i's (non-negative) utility for S i . We also assume that u i (S) is normalized to 1, and
The allocation of divisible resources, under private utilities of the agents, is commonly known as the cake cutting problem. Divide-and-Choose (a.k.a Cutand-Choose), a long known protocol, achieves envy-freeness for the case of two agents. Envy-freeness is reached once u i (S i ) ≥ u i (S j ) for every pair of agents i, j. Proportionality is less demanding than envy-freeness since it requires that u i (S i ) ≥ u i (S)/n = 1/n. Historically, proportional protocols for n ≥ 3 agents exist since the 1940's [23] . However, the first envy-free protocol for any number of agents dates back to 1995 [6] .
The interest for the problem when S consists of m ≥ n indivisible items, and no monetary compensation is possible, is more recent. Let us first briefly review the case of public and additive utilities. By additive it is meant that u i (S i ) = j∈Si u i (j) where u i (j) is a convenient abbreviation of u i ({j}). Thus, an agent's utility for any bundle of items can be derived from his utilities for the single items. In this context, one can mention the contribution of Lipton et al., [16] . Since no envy-free allocation is guaranteed to exist in the indivisible setting (proportional allocations are also not guaranteed), they seek for minimum-envy allocations. Unfortunately, for any constant c, there can be no 2 m c -approximation algorithm unless P=NP. However, the problem is tractable for the minimization of the envy-ratio
An important body of research deals with the design of polynomial approximation algorithms for the maximization of the poorest agent's utility. This optimization challenge is known as the Max-Min allocation or the Santa Claus problem [3, 9, 2, 14, 1, 24] .
Bezáková and Dani give a 1/(m − n + 1)-approximation algorithm and show that no ρ-approximation algorithm with ρ > 0.5 is likely to exist [3] . Golovin [9] provides an algorithm whose solution guarantees a utility of OP T /k to at least (1 − 1/k)n agents, for any given k ∈ Z + , where OP T is the optimal value of the problem. A Ω(1/ √ n)-approximation is also given for a subcase called "Big goods/Small goods": small goods have utility in {0, 1} and big goods have utility in {0, x} for some x > 1. Bansal and Sviridenko [2] study a restricted case in which u i ({j}) ∈ {0, p j } and provide an algorithm with an approximation factor of Ω(log log log n/ log log n). Khot and Ponnuswami [14] and Asadpour and Saberi [1] provide approximation algorithms for the general Santa Claus problem with ratios (2n − 1) −1 and Ω 1/ √ n log 3 n , respectively. If the agents have homogeneous utilities for the items then Woeginger's polynomial-time approximation scheme can be used [24] .
Though focused on the utility of the poorest agent, the approach of Demko and Hill [8] differs from the Santa Claus problem. The goal is to give an absolute value t n ∈ [0, 1] such that an allocation (S i ) i∈N satisfying ∀i ∈ N, u i (S i ) ≥ t n exists in any case. An immediate answer would be t n = 0 if one thinks of the case of two agents both having a utility of 1 for an item i and a null utility for any other item i = i : there must be one of these agents who does not receive i and thus t n = 0. Besides n, Demko and Hill's approach comprises a parameter α in its input, that is the maximum utility an agent can have for a single item (the instance is normalized, so u i (S) = 1 for every agent i). We have α = max i,j∈N ×S u i (j) in general and α = 1 in the previous example with two single-minded agents. Demko and Hill give a nonincreasing function Definition 1) and prove that t n ≥ V n (α).
Definition 1. [12,18] Given any integer
be the unique nonincreasing function satisfying V n (x) = 1/n for x = 0, whereas for
where It is noteworthy that, within the class of nonincreasing functions, V n is shown to be the best lower bound for t n [8] . Thus, t n is equal to V n in I(n, p) for every integer p ≥ 1, i.e. within every interval where V n is decreasing.
Since only n and α are retained, Demko and Hill's approach is partially oblivious of the instance and t n may be much lower than the optimal value of the Santa Claus problem. This explains the apparent paradox of having a 0.5-inapproximability result for the Santa Claus problem and the possibility to build, in polynomial time, an allocation (S i ) i∈N satisfying u i (S i ) ≥ V n (α) for all i ∈ N . Indeed, Markakis and Psomas [18] have recently proposed a polynomial algorithm, called allocate, which returns a solution (
Here, α i is agent i's maximum utility for a single item (in a normalized instance) and so α = max i∈N α i . Since V n is nonincreasing,
In other words, allocate guarantees V n (α) for everyone and possibly more if not the poorest.
Very recently, a non-monotone function W n satisfying W n (x) ≥ V n (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] and min i∈N W n (α i ) ≤ t n has been proposed [10] . The new function W n applies on a matroid problem which generalizes the problem of allocating indivisible goods. A guarantee of W n (α i ) is obtained via a deterministic algorithm called threshold which is an extension of allocate.
allocate and threshold deal with public utilities because their input comprises the agents' utilities. The problem of allocating m indivisible items under private and additive utilities has been investigated by Bezáková and Dani for two agents [3] . They revisit Divide-and-Choose and propose a randomized version in which the utility of the poorest agent is at least 1/2 in expectation. In fact, Bezáková and Dani resort to randomization because, as previously mentioned, the worst case utility of an agent is 0 if α is put aside (V n (x) = 0 when x ≥ 1 n−1 ). The problem of extending the protocol to a larger number of agents is posed by Bezáková and Dani as a future work. Up to our knowledge, existing protocols are not directly comparable to our work. Knaster's procedure of sealed bids makes monetary compensations. Lucas' method of markers relies on a strong linearity assumption saying that every player can equally divide the items in contiguous bundles if they are placed on a line.
The Model
This article deals with matroids which are well known structures in combinatorial optimization [15] . A matroid M = (X, F ) is a finite set of elements X and a collection F of subsets of X satisfying the following properties:
Every element of F that is inclusion-wise maximal is called a base. Moreover, without loss of generality, we assume that ∀e ∈ X, {e} ∈ F. More details on matroids are given in Section 4.
The input of our problem is a matroid M = (X, F ) and a set of agents N = {1, ..., n}. The output is a single base B of F that is shared by the agents. Each agent i ∈ N has a non-negative utility u i (e) for every element e ∈ X.
The utility functions of the agents are additive, i.e. u i (X ) = e∈X u i (e) for all X ⊆ X and i ∈ N . These utility functions are also private, so the resulting base is not constructed directly. Instead, B is built by the agents via a protocol.
The resulting base B can be decomposed in n disjoint subsets B 1 , . . . , B n such that for all i ∈ N , B i is the contribution of agent i. A worst case analysis being conducted, we can suppose that the utility of any agent for B is reduced to his utility for his contribution. Indeed
Besides its correctness, the protocol should be fair, i.e. offering a guarantee on the utility of every agent. Following the approach of Demko and Hill [8] and Markakis and Psomas [18] , the guarantee of agent i depends on α i , which is defined as agent i's maximum utility for a single element.
Let OP T i (M) be the value of a base that maximizes u i for i ∈ N . We assume, without loss of generality, that after a possible rescaling, the instance is normalized so that OP T i (M) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Thus, α i is defined as
Our contribution is a deterministic protocol for up to 8 agents. We prove that the agents can enjoy the guarantee given in [18] , that is V n (α i ), ∀i ∈ N . We also elaborate a strategy that agents can adopt if they want to meet the aforementioned guarantees. These strategies are based on polynomial time algorithms.
Matroid Properties
In a matroid M = (X, F ), the elements of F and 2 X \ F are called independent sets and dependent sets, respectively. The bases of a matroid are its inclusion-wise maximal independent sets. All bases of a matroid M have the same cardinality r(M), defined as the rank of M. The set of bases of M is denoted by B.
Matroid theory has significantly contributed to the understanding of some important combinatorial structures. The forests of a multigraph is a typical example of a matroid, called the graphic matroid. The bases are the spanning trees if the graph is connected. Another example is the partition matroid where the set of elements X is partitioned into k disjoint sets X 1 , . . . , X k for some integer k ≥ 1. Given non-negative integers b i (i = 1, ..., k), the sets F ⊆ X satisfying |F ∩X i | ≤ b i form a matroid. Notably, allocating a set of m indivisible items to n agents can be seen as a partition matroid. Build m sets
. Taking i k means allocating item i to agent k. We also cite the uniform matroid which is formed by all subsets of length at most k elements for some integer k ≥ 1. The uniform matroid can model some multi-winner election problems [21, 17, 22] . Last example is the transversal matroid defined by m (not necessarily disjoint) sets X 1 , . . . , X m , subsets of a ground set X and F = {T ∈ 2 X : T is a partial transversal of X} where a partial transversal is a set T ⊆ X such that an injective map Φ : T → [m] satisfying t ∈ X Φ(t) exists. Example 1 given in Introduction can be modeled as a transversal matroid such that X is the set of candidates and X i is the set of available candidates during date i for all i = 1, ..., m.
Since we work on a general matroid, our results apply to all these problems.
In the presence of a non-negative weight function w : X → IR + , we use the convenient shorthand notation w(X ) = x∈X w(x) for all X ⊆ X. A weighted matroid is a matroid where each element e has a weight w(e) ≥ 0 and we denote it by M = (X, F , w) .
Given a weighted matroid M = (X, F , w), a classical optimization problem consists in computing a base B ∈ B that maximizes w(B). This problem is solved by the famous polynomial time Greedy algorithm described for example in [15] . The maximum weight of a base and the subset of bases which are maximal for w are denoted by OP T w (M) and B * w , respectively. We assume, without loss of generality, that after a possible rescaling, the instance is normalized so that OP T w (M) = 1.
The time complexity of matroid algorithms depends on the difficulty of testing if a set F ∈ F. We always assume that this test is made in O(1) time.
Given a matroid M = (X, F ) and a subset X ⊂ X, if X ∈ F then the contraction of M by X , denoted by M/X , is the structure (X \ X , F ) where
It is well known that M/X is a matroid.
Every matroid satisfies the multiple exchange property [11] : Let A and B be bases of a matroid M, and let {A 1 , . . . , A n } be a partition of A. Then there exists a partition {B 1 , . . . , B n } of B such that A\A i ∪ B i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n are all bases of M. This result is existential but the construction of {B 1 , . . . , B n } can be done in polynomial time [4] .
Let us give some general lemmas that are used later. 
Lemma 1. Let M = (X, F , w) be a weighted matroid. Given a maximum weight base

Lemma 3. Let S be an independent set of a weighted matroid
M = (X, F , w) such that OP T w (M) ≥ ρ 0 and OP T w (M/S) < ρ 1 ≤ ρ 0 . Then for every base T of M/S, OP T w (M/T ) ≥ ρ 0 − ρ 1 .
Lemma 4. Given two integers n, k such that n ≥ 2 and n > k ≥ 1, and a real x ∈ I(n, p) ∪ N I(n, p) where p ≥ 1 is an integer, we have that
1. k n V k n k x ≥ V n (x), 2. k n V k n k x ≥ k+1 n V k+1 ( n k+1 x).
A Protocol for Two Agents
Divide-and-Choose (a.k.a. Cut-and-Choose) is a well known envy-free protocol for two agents on a divisible resource. One agent divides the resource into what he believes are equal halves, and the other agent chooses the half he prefers. We propose in Protocol 1 a similar protocol which deals with matroids. Agent 1 is called the divider and let us see how he can guarantee to himself a utility of V 2 (α 1 ) with the use of polynomial algorithms. Agent 1 computes a base A that he partitions in two parts A 1 and A 2 and his contribution is one of them. Thus, his utility is at least min{u 1 (A 1 ), u 1 (A 2 )}. Let A be a base that maximizes u 1 , obtained by applying Greedy [15] . We have u 1 (A ) = 1 by the normalization hypothesis. Using Lemma 1 with n = 2 and w = u 1 , there exists a partition 
because Agent 1's largest utility for an element of A is α 1 . Since Allocate and Greedy are polynomial, the divider can guarantee to himself a utility of
Agent 2 is called the chooser and he has in hand the partition {A 1 , A 2 } communicated by the divider. Let us see how he can guarantee to himself a utility of 1 2 ≥ V 2 (α 2 ) with the use of polynomial algorithms. Let B be a base that maximizes u 2 . By the multiple exchange property, there exists a partition of B into B 1 and B 2 such that A 1 ∪B 2 and A 2 ∪B 1 are two bases of M. We have that u 2 (B ) = u 2 (B 1 ) + u 2 (B 2 ) = 1 by the normalization hypothesis. Use Greedy to complete A 1 and A 2 into the bases A 1 ∪B 2 and A 2 ∪B 1 of M, respectively. B 2 and B 2 are both bases of M/A 1 but B 2 is optimal for the matroid M/A 1 . We get that u 2 (B 2 ) ≥ u 2 (B 2 ) and also u 2 (B 1 ) ≥ u 2 (B 1 ) with similar arguments. Thus,
Proposition 1. Using Protocol 1, Agents 1 and 2 can guarantee to themselves
V 2 (α 1 ) and 1 2 = 1 2 V 1 (2α 2 ) ≥ V 2 (α 2 ), respectively.
A Protocol for Three Agents
When there is a third agent, the protocol described in Protocol 2 is more involved: the chooser should ask the third agent before realizing any action.
Again, Agent 1 is called the divider and he can guarantee to himself a utility of V 3 (α 1 ) with polynomial algorithms. At Step 1 of the protocol, it suffices to build a base A that maximizes u 1 with Greedy and cut it in 3 parts with Allocate. Three disjoint sets {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 } are obtained, such that 
. Since either B 1 or B 2 belongs to the final base, Agent 2's utility is at least 2 3 V 2 (α 2 ). Using the facts that V 2 is nonincreasing,α 2 ≤ 3α 2 /2 and item 1 of Lemma 4 with n = 3 and k = 2, we get that
. At the fourth step of the protocol, Agent 2 has to apply Divide-and-Choose (Protocol 1) on M/A i as a chooser. We know from the analysis of divide-and-choose that the chooser's utility is at least the utility of a maximum base, divided by 2. Hence, Agent 2's utility is at least (we explain why in Assumption 1). At Step 3 of the protocol, Agent 3 applies Divide-and-Choose on M/A i as a chooser. Again, the chooser's utility is at least the utility of a maximum base, divided by 2. So in this case, the utility of Agent 3 is at least 
. Thus, the completion of F with Greedy leads to a set F 3 valued at least 
Proposition 2. Using Protocol 2, Agents 1, 2 and 3 can guarantee to themselves
V 3 (α 1 ), 2 3 V 2 3 2 α 2 ≥ V 3 (α 2 ) and 1 3 = 1 3 V 1 (3α 3 ) ≥ V 3 (α 3 ), respectively.
A Protocol for n ≤ 8 Agents
We present a protocol for n ≤ 8 agents in Protocol 3, which is a generalization of Protocols 1 and 2. The high level idea is the following: A first agent, called the divider and denoted by i 1 , finds a base and partitions it into n parts. A second agent, called the pivot and denoted by i 2 , determines an ordering (permutation) σ of the n parts. Next, the protocol is to find a k ∈ [n] such that the k first parts σ(1), ..., σ(k) or the n − k last parts σ(k + 1), ..., σ(n) are shared by k or n − k agents, respectively. This gives a partial solution which is completed into a base. A recursive call of the protocol arranges a sharing of the complement by n − k or k agents, respectively.
We note that if we make a recursive call on a subset of agents S ⊆ N such that the previous divider i 1 is in S, then there is no need to choose a different agent as the divider. We can also keep the shares A 1 , . . . , A n that i 1 has previously built. Moreover, making a recursive call on the protocol for one agent (Steps 4 and 26 of Protocol 3) is similar to use Algorithm 4 (Divide) which describes the task of the divider because this unique agent has just to find a base of a matroid which is directly given by Divide.
Let us give an example on the application of (3) ) (see Level 4) .
We first prove that Protocol 3 is well defined, i.e. a return instruction is reached in any case and the algorithm terminates.
Lemma 5. If n = |N | ≤ 8 then Protocol 3 is well defined.
The Divider's Point of View
We assume that Agent i 1 ∈ N is the divider and let us see how he can guarantee a utility of V n (α i1 ) to himself. 
Choose a set J1 of n − k0 agents as follows: J1 = {i2} at the beginning, next add new agents from
Fig. 2. Example of an execution of Protocol 3
The divider is asked to produce a base A and a partition of it into n parts A 1 , . . . , A n . The protocol is such that the contribution of i 1 is one of these parts. Therefore, it is in his interest to maximize min i∈N u i1 (A i ). Lemma To summarize, the way the divider can initially guarantee to himself V n (α i1 ) is described in Algorithm 4. The protocol is such that n− k agents share M in which k parts of the divider are contracted. A justification of Assumption 1 is that every non-divider makes a rough estimation of his utility for the resulting base. This rough estimation is to ensure a utility of 1/n in case of an even cut of the best base (from the non-divider's viewpoint) of the contracted matroid.
After finding the appropriate set J of agents for sharing M/(∪ j∈S A σ(j) ), next lemma shows that every agent of J satisfies Assumption 1 in Protocol 3. We suppose that B = {B 1 , . . . , B n } is the final base returned by Protocol 3 where B i is the contribution of agent i ∈ N . When n ≤ 8, Protocol 3 gives a guarantee at least as good as the guarantee of Allocate [18] but Protocol 3 works with matroids (a generalization of the allocation of indivisible goods) and it copes with private utilities (as opposed, Allocate deals with public utilities). 
Discussion
The protocol presented in this paper is valid for n ≤ 8 agents. We managed to produce a protocol for n = 9 and n = 10 agents but the number of cases to check has grown rapidly and we were unable to write a concise version of the protocol and its analysis. However, we conjecture that a protocol exists for any number of agents n.
We note that we work with Hill's function V n whereas a slightly better guarantee, through a new function W n , was recently proposed, especially as W n is valid for matroids [10] . This is due to the non-monotonicity of W n and we need a monotonicity argument in the proof of Theorem 1.
